THE LIMITATIONS OF THE GITA AND KIERKEGAARD
Among the vast array of literature discussing the nature of evil (and subsequently the ‘good life’) there are few books which discuss (in length) the philosophical value of detachment. Despite this, the Hindu scripture the Bhagavad-Gita and Soren Kierkegaard’s existential philosophical treatise Fear and Trembling have provided a profound impact on religious and philosophical thought as to how attaching oneself to external things inadvertently causes suffering, and consequently, possible evils. While these pieces of literature are surely influential in there own right, they unfortunately limit themselves when discussing the value of detachment (or ‘philosophical resignation’). While the Bhagavad-Gita argues that one should detach from the outcome of action (‘the fruit of action’), it still relies on a complete devotion to action itself, thus supplanting one attachment (the outcome of action) with another (action itself). On the other hand, Kierkegaard argues that, in order to transcend external sufferings, one must become a ‘knight of infinite resignation’ who is not marked by the loss of external things, but can fully accept the temporal nature of externalities in-them-selves; and yet, this is merely the first step to becoming a ‘knight of faith’ in which, after such acceptance, one’s reliance rests upon God. While both texts argue for the value of detachment, they inadvertently smuggle in the reliance of a higher transcendental order – the Bhagavad-Gita discards the outcome of action only to ascribe a divinity to action itself (manifested by the ‘eternal self’) and Kierkegaard discards temporalities only to rely on an eternal Other (God). In this sense, both texts are limited to the very thing which they attempt to escape – the evils of attachment. From this, it may be said that such texts do not grant an individual further escape – one cannot simply ‘save himself’ but must look towards another form of attachment in an alternative transcendental form. In short, the evils of attachment cannot be remedied by instead attaching to a higher power, but rather, further deconstruction must occur which allows individuals to be radically free – a deconstruction which philosophical pessimism provides in its purview.
The Bhagavad-Gita discusses in length the evils of attachment, however, one of its most important teachings is found in “The Fifth Teaching: Renunciation of Action.” Within this section, Krishna, the god which embodies the eternal self, argues that, while renunciation of action may have its merits, discipline of action overrides this form of detachment.[1] That is, one must detach from the outcome of action, but be devoted to action itself. Moreover, Krishna argues that to renounce the fruit of action further provides justification for the discipline of action; thus, while Arjuna may be struggling with the inner conflict of going to battle, he must do so anyway in devotion to action and thus the eternal self. Krishna states: “A man who relinquishes attachment and dedicates actions to the infinite spirit is not stained by evil…He should not rejoice from what disgusts him; secure in understanding, undeluded, knowing the infinite spirit, he abides in it.” (60, 62). From this, a new attachment is found – while the Gita condones the value of relinquishing attachment, it replaces attachment of outcomes with an attachment to a divine presence (infinite spirit). For the Gita, action itself is thus the supreme ‘new God’ which supersedes external desires; instead, one must embody the eternal self through action alone regardless of the outcome.[2] However, this replacement puts one in a further predicament regarding the evils of attachment – if one relinquishes the outcome of action but must embody the ‘infinite spirit’ of action itself, then he cannot merely escape attachment altogether. Rather, for the Gita, the necessity for divinity supplants the fruit of action through the lens of an ‘eternal self’ – one is still condemned to attachment, however, via the embodiment of a transcendental form. While the Gita correctly points out the evils of attachments via the fruit of action, the text inadvertently creates new forms of attachment through the ideal of divine values; in this way, the Gita is a bit contradictory and paradoxical. Furthermore, while one can see the limitations of the Bhagavad-Gita’s inquiry on the evils of attachment, one may likewise consider Soren Kierkegaard’s philosophy on attachment as depicted in Fear and Trembling.
Throughout Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard champions the value of becoming a ‘knight of infinite resignation.’ To become such a knight, one must consider the temporalities of what surrounds him, and concede to the natural decay and suffering characteristic of the human condition. Moreover, a knight of resignation accepts such sufferings, and in doing so, reaches an inner peace thus providing a newfound detachment indicative of seeing the world through resigned eyes. Regarding the knight, Kierkegaard states: “He drains in infinite resignation the deep sorrow of existence, he knows the bliss of infinity, he has felt the pain of renouncing everything, whatever is most precious in the world, and yet to him finitude tastes just as good as to one who has never known anything higher.” (69-70). According to Kierkegaard, becoming a knight requires the pain of renunciation – it is not a peaceful process, however, inner peace is thus attained after resignation has consistently been met. In this sense, because renunciation is painful, it thus connotes the evils of attachment; it is not the renunciation itself which incurs pain upon the knight-in-making, but rather, it is one’s attachments which make renunciation so difficult for the knight. In this way, Kierkegaard provides a beautiful conception of attachment as evil, and the value of resignation; however, he goes on to supplant this original value of resignation with a newfound attachment to God – he states: “…for only in infinite resignation does my eternal validity become transparent to me, and only then can there be talk of grasping existence on the strength of faith…on the strength of the fact that for God all things are possible” (75). Now, while this new state, being a ‘knight of faith,’ rightly requires a state of resignation, he nevertheless requires external salvation. And so, the paradox of Kierkegaard’s sentiments towards resignation again rely on the very attachments which he criticizes – while one may attain peace through infinite resignation, it is only the case if he leans on the prospect of a divine hand. The notion of ‘giving it up to God’ is very strong here; one might equivocate notions of ‘trust’ versus ‘faith,’ and yet, either of these things promote a sense of attachment – it is as if Kierkegaard is saying that one must trust God, or, have faith. Again, there is no self-directed salvation for the individual; he again must appeal to the notion of divinity. And so, in replacing former attachments with a new one, Kierkegaard seems to be acting in bad faith here. [3] Moreover, just as “trust” and “faith” are often equivocated, many may suggest that the attributes of ‘devotion’ versus ‘attachment’ should be considered.
While some might connote the notion of attachment as an external ascription to say, an object or a temporal state (a living organism) it likewise manifests through the phenomena of ideas. That is, the distinction between devotion and attachment should be reconciled easily because devotion is a symptom of attachment and not its remedial counterpart. One may argue that, in contrast to the outward external process of attachment, devotion is an internal mechanism that engages with unconditionality. However, does the Gita and Kierkegaard not essentially argue for both? To say that one does not become attached to ideas is to disregard the constraints of common sense. That is, the logic of most religions relies on such attachment – while the internal mechanism of devotion may occur, it only occurs due to the framework of attachment. To embody pure devotion is to embody unconditionality, and to embody unconditionality is to embody choice. Thus, one chooses to remain attached to that which has conjured devotion in him in the first place. Moreover, this is so often the case with those who are engulfed by a culture of strict moralization (e.g. Sharia law, militant atheism, Christian nationalism, ‘woke-ism’ etc.); they do not choose the morals they are raised with but are merely attached to them by sheer ideological milieu; devotion only occurs after an intellectually honest analysis of attachment. [4] While an individual may devote himself into various forms of delusion or out of it, he is first and foremost attached to ideas. [5] Thus, the counter-argument of this distinction between attachment and devotion as something which is of remedial value is unsavory; since devotion is essentially the offspring of attachment, attachment thus works as an internal apparatus of the self as well – attachment is not limited to externalities just as devotion is not characterized by existing outside of attachment. This being said, one naturally poses the question – “Is there any way out of this renewal of attachment?” To answer this, philosophically pessimistic literature should be included in such discourse.
At its core, philosophical pessimism suggests a radical sense of freedom – it does not constrain an individual to a set of ideas which renews the evils of attachment (or devotion), but rather, it acts more as an attitude towards being in which the acceptance of suffering and evil pervades one’s worldview – there is no renewal of attachment through a transcendental state or divine presence. Acceptance is in-itself the mode of pessimistic living without revival of faulty transcendence.[6] Compassion may be intrinsic to a moral compass for the pessimist; however, it is not an arbiter of attachment. That is, from a psychologically egoistic perspective, one does not need to feel compassion, however, when he does, then it is clear when genuine moral action is enacted.[7] In contrast to the Bhagavad-Gita, the pessimist does not need to act because there is no divine value to action-in-itself. Of course, choosing not to act is in itself a choice, however, the absence of action still connotes a neutral value – in non-action, there is not a negative summation to an individual’s mode of being, he remains at ‘0’ and not at ‘-1.’ Thus, there is not a negative output to the absence of action to which the Gita condemns essentially as a lack of discipline. Furthermore, the pessimist does not require a sense of faith to inadvertently replace his attitude of acceptance. In contrast to Kierkegaard, the pessimist merely stops at the process of infinite resignation; however, such resignation does not necessarily occur through the renunciation of attachments. Rather, by witnessing the very decay which characterizes the human condition, resignation is the natural conclusion for the pessimist – for the pessimist, renunciation is not ‘painful’ as Kierkegaard purports but is a reflexively adaptive impulse towards the pain and evils of attachment. In understanding these contrasts, it thus becomes clear that, for the pessimist, there is no overcoming the evils of attachment by inadvertently clinging to a higher power whether it be the divinity of the self (action) or God. Moreover, while there may be some meditations on the conditions of attachment, this does not mean that such pessimistic meditations intend on renewing attachment itself. One such practice that is called into question is a focus on the sublime.
For Schopenhauer, the father of philosophical pessimism, one practice of temporarily escaping the inherent sufferings of life was to meditate on what he termed ‘pure ideas.’ In short, pure ideas are those that embody the will outside of human articulation through aesthetic experiences such as music, meditating on art, witnessing beautiful landscapes, etc. [8] By meditating on the aesthetic experience, one can be in touch with the inevitable sublimities of life which exist beyond himself – time, death, beauty, in a word, the forces of nature. Schopenhauer states: "…for that moment we are delivered from the miserable pressure of the will…as necessary for knowledge of the Idea, as pure contemplation, absorption in perception, being lost in the object, forgetting all individuality…It is then all the same whether we see the setting sun from a prison or from a palace.” (136). From this position, there is no true escape from evil or suffering, only temporary relief, however, such relief should not be confused with newfound attachment. The honest pessimist does not supplant his acceptance of the negative value of human life by essentially distracting himself with temporal relations to sublimities. He does not lean on a sort of aesthetic anchoring as a new form of attachment to which suffering may derive, rather, to engage with the aesthetic experience is to reconvene with the faultiness of attachment itself. To bear witness to the sublime is to again recognize the evils of attachment; the pessimist does not raise himself to be a devotee of the sublime, he is merely an innocent bystander, and, bearing witness, he concedes to the entropy of the will just as ants do to him. By renouncing both action and faith, the pessimist finds himself in total resignation. There is nothing expected of him, moreover, he is not attached to resignation because it is not an ideal; it is a philosophical temperament and mode of being that has culminated due to the very expense of attachment in the first place.
The Bhagavad-Gita and Fear and Trembling are important texts that discuss the philosophical value of detachment; however, they are marked by the limitation of reattachment to a higher power. According to the Bhagavad-Gita, the attachment to the outcomes of action highlights the origins of evil and is rightly condemned. However, the Gita goes on to counterintuitively suggest a new form of attachment through a higher power manifested as the eternal self and action – one must act even in the most ethically problematic scenarios (e.g. Arjuna going to battle) despite the outcome of our actions. Moreover, Kierkegaard suggests that, despite the value of becoming a ‘knight of infinite resignation,’ becoming a ‘knight of faith’ is then necessary after the process of renunciation. In resignation, one is thus required to turn to a higher power to anchor himself once again in the face of an absurd existence. Like the Gita, Kierkegaard looks to a higher power to reassert attachment ironically after providing a method of reconciling with it. Because both texts seem to intrinsically negate themselves through their methodologies, the philosophically pessimistic practice is thus suggested. By engaging with total resignation – one becomes radically free and able to ‘save himself’ without looking to a higher power. Moreover, the honest pessimist does not reattach himself to the notion of divine value – while he may engage in modes of temporary relief upon engaging with the aesthetic experience, he does not act in bad faith. By communing with the sublime, the pessimist reaffirms himself in total resignation by acknowledging that such temporary relief is merely that – temporary. [9] Rather than attaching himself to the sublime, he merely bears witness to it. While the Bhagavad-Gita and Kierkegaard offer compelling texts on the significance of resignation, they do not adequately integrate the philosophical freedom which pessimistic thought provides; they are limited by the very attribute of attachment which they condemn.
References
Beiser, Frederick C. Weltschmerz: Pessimism in German Philosophy, 1860-1900. Oxford University Press, 2018.
Cioran, E. M. The New Gods. Translated by Richard Howard, Quadrangle, 1974.
Kierkegaard, Søren, and Alastair Hannay. Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric by Johannes de Silentio. Penguin Books, 2003.
La Rochefoucauld, François, et al. Collected Maxims and Other Reflections. Oxford University Press, 2008.
Miller, Barbara Stoler. The Bhagavad-Gita: Krishna’s Counsel in Time of War. Bantam Books, 2004.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness, dhspriory.org/kenny/PhilTexts/Sartre/BeingAndNothingness.pdf.
Schopenhauer, Arthur, and Wolfgang Schirmacher. The Essential Schopenhauer: Key Selections from the World as Will and Representation and Other Writings. Harper Perennial, 2010.
[1] See the Bhagavad-Gita – “Renunciation and discipline in action both effect good beyond measure; but of the two, discipline in action surpasses renunciation of action.” p. 59.
[2] See Cioran, E. M. The New Gods – “We cannot pray to a god who is probably true. Prayer does not demean itself to subtleties nor tolerate distinctions within the Supreme: even when it doubts, it does so in the name of truth. We do not beseech a nuance.” p. 25.
[3] See Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness – “We say indifferently of a person that he shows signs of bad faith or that he lies to himself…The essence of the lie implies in fact that the liar actually is in complete possession of the truth which he is hiding…Now this doubly negative attitude rests on the transcendent; the fact expressed is transcedent since it does not exist, and the original negation rests on a truth; that is, on a particular type of transcendence.” p. 48.
[4] See Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness – “One does not undergo his bad faith; one is not infected with it; it is not a state. But consciousness affects itself with bad faith..It follows first that the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same…” p. 49.
[5] See Kierkegaard, Søren, and Alastair Hannay. Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric by Johannes de Silentio – “Then he sorrowed, and the sorrow did not deceive him as life had done; it did all it could for him and in the sweetness of sorrow he possessed his disappointed expectation.” p. 51.
[6] See Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness – “To be sure, the one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a pleasing untruth. Bad faith then has in appearance the structure of falsehood. Only what changes everything is the fact that in bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth. Thus the duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not exist here.” p. 49.
[7] See Beiser, Frederick C. Weltschmerz: Pessimism in German Philosophy, 1860-1900 – “A person who sacrifices his life for the community in time of war is still acting from self-interest (e.g. the love of glory)…If moral actions have to be selfless, Mainlander argues, then there are no moral actions, because all actions, even the most holy or saintly, derive from self-interest…Mainlander contends that we never leave ourselves in sympathizing with others; it is myself that I put in the place of the other. When we sympathize with another, we feel miserable within ourselves.” pp. 219-220.
[8] In the pessimistic tradition, the conception of the Schopenhauerian will or will-to-live is the irrational cosmological force which all things are controlled by – space strives to expand, plants strive to grow, animals strive to survive, humans strive to be happy, and in this striving, suffering is thus prolonged.
[9] See La Rochefoucauld, François, et al. Collected Maxims and Other Reflections – “Philosophy triumphs easily over past and future ills; but present ills triumph over it.” p. 9.
